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It is difficult to know exactly what goes on underwater. We have
yet to come up with a Jane Goodall who will go live with the
salmon and figure them out.
Jon L. Jacobson, 1998.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was once reported by English fishing skippers that cod
shoals in Canada's North Atlantic waters were so thick that the
fishermen could hardly row their boats through them.1 Awestruck
onlookers recorded the existence of salmon-packed bays, massive
herring spawns, freakishly enormous twenty-pound lobsters and
seven-foot cod.2 For centuries, these mythical creatures flourished
in an ecosystem whose bounty seemed limitless. But, as the saying
goes, "all good things must come to an end." A 2003 study reported
that only 10% of the world's large predatory fish remained in the
sea,3 many of which were once found in enormous quantities off
Canada's North Atlantic coast.4 Sadly, this confirms that a half-
century of overfishing has devastated Canada's once-fertile
waters.
Until the 1950s, Canada's North Atlantic was fished prima-
rily by local fishing operations, as foreign vessels were unable to
yield catches large enough to recoup the costs of fishing distant
waters.5 However, in the mid-1950s, international industrializa-
tion and technological advances made it easier to locate and cap-
ture particularly valuable, straddling and highly migratory fish
stocks ("SHMFS"). s These stocks are especially vulnerable to
1. A Run on the Banks: How "Factory Fishing" Decimated Newfoundland Cod, E/
THE ENVTL. MAG., Mar.-Apr. 2001, available at http://www.emagazine.com/view/?507
[hereinafter A Run on the Banks].
2. Id.
3. Ransom A. Myers & Boris Worm, Rapid Worldwide Depletion of Predatory
Fish Communities, 423 NATURE 280, 282 (2003).
4. Id. at 280. These large predatory species include codfish, tuna, billfish, and
swordfish. Id.
5. See Greenpeace, History of the Grand Banks Cod Fishery, http://www.green
peace.org/usa/news/no-fish-hunt-seals/history-of-the-grand-banks-cod (last visited
Oct. 13, 2008).
6. Julie R. Mack, International Fisheries Management: How the U.N. Conference
on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Changes the Law of Fishing on the
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overfishing because they habitually straddle or swim in and out of
state-protected waters, allowing their capture by fisherman in
regulation-free, international waters.7 Armed with technological
advances, foreign vessels flooded the waters off Canada's east
coast, pillaging the plentiful SHMFS. Initially, the international
community recognized the dangers of overfishing and forged pre-
liminary agreements in an attempt to regulate distressed stocks.8
However, the agreements proved largely ineffective, and eventu-
ally overfishing of the North Atlantic by international and domes-
tic fleets resulted in the mass depletion of Canada's SHMFS.9
On the domestic front, Canada was slow in taking proactive
measures to defend against the annihilation of SHMFS off its
coast, and unfortunately, the side effects of inaction proved disas-
trous to the fragile North Atlantic ecosystem. For example, by the
1980s, the Canadian cod fishery had collapsed, forcing Canadian
officials to declare a moratorium on the harvest of cod in a last
ditch effort to prevent the species' extinction.' ° The delay of State
action in defending the cod industry and other SHMFS frustrated
many and drew criticism as "a ridiculous example of closing the
barn door after the horse has escaped."" However, much of the
delay stems from the difficulties faced by international and
domestic regulators in isolating and adequately protecting
Canada's waning SHMFS."2
The story of Canada's struggle is of interest for several rea-
sons. First, Canada's nutrient-rich North Atlantic waters are
fished by states around the world that depend on its bounty. The
obliteration of SHMFS in these waters will necessarily damage a
sector of the global economy that accounts for $84.9 billion in
annual revenue and 41 million jobs. 3 Second, the story illustrates
the interplay of international law, domestic law, and political
High Seas, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 313, 314 (1996); Michael Bhargava, International
Year of the Ocean, Redux, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 413, 414 (2004).
7. E.g., Karen L. Smith, Highly Migratory Fish Species: Can International and
Domestic Law Save the North Atlantic Swordfish?, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 5, 6
(1999).
8. See, e.g., Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of
the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter High Seas
Fishing Convention].
9. See Andrew Fagenholz, A Fish in Water: Sustainable Canadian Atlantic
Fisheries Management and International Law, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 639, 640
(2004).
10. See A Run on the Banks, supra note 1.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Mack, supra note 6, at 314.
13. See U.N. Food & Agric. Org. [FAO] Fisheries & Aquaculture Dep't, The State of
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activities by affected industry and non-governmental organiza-
tions in dealing with a serious environmental problem. Third, and
most importantly, Canada's dilemma is analogous to that faced by
many other states in attempting to regulate their own distressed
SHMFS. Thus, the Canadian paradigm addressed by this article
and the recommendations made herein are applicable to states
with similarly threatened fisheries. This article submits that
Canada's steadfast dedication to the enforcement of a combined
international and domestic regulatory scheme is making strides to
nurture distressed North Atlantic SHMFS back to healthy, sus-
tainable levels. Moreover, a global realization of the damages
caused by the overfishing of SHMFS and a resolve to nurture the
once magnificent fishery has begun to positively impact the health
of these stocks.
Part II of this article presents a historical analysis of laws
relating to the harvest of North Atlantic SHMFS and will be bro-
ken down into two codependent sections. The first will detail a
shift in international law from the traditional notion of freedom of
the high seas, towards the acceptance of specific conventions
aimed at the conservation and management of SHMFS on the
high seas. The second section will explore the damage caused by
Canada's initial reliance on international law to protect these
stocks and the country's necessary evolution towards the enforce-
ment of a combined international and domestic regulatory
scheme. Part III demonstrates how Canada's adherence to the
combined regulatory scheme has provided a view towards sustain-
able fisheries through a case study of the North Atlantic swordfish
fishery. Part IV provides recommendations on how Canada can
move closer to achieving maximum sustainable yields from its
North Atlantic fishery by applying lessons learned from the North
Atlantic swordfish fishery to other problematic SHMFS.
II. REGULATION OF NORTH ATLANTIC FISH STOCKS
A. International Regulation: A Historical Journey
towards the Fish Stocks Agreement
International fishery regulation has been based in large part
upon a state's absolute control of territorial waters. Traditionally,
the international community accepted that a state's territory
included waters and natural resources extending up to three miles
the World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006, 5-6 (2007), available at http://www.fao.org
docrep/009/A0699e/A0699e00.htm.
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from its shores. 14 This tradition also dictated that waters outside a
state's territorial limits were considered high seas, freely accessi-
ble by all.15 Nevertheless, by the latter half of the twentieth cen-
tury many states unilaterally disregarded this tradition by
claiming territorial waters well beyond three miles, mostly in an
attempt to protect distressed fisheries and other natural
resources, necessitating uniformity. 16
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS I")
In 1958, the international community recognized the need to
create a uniform agreement on the limitations of the reach of ter-
ritorial waters at UNCLOS I.' 7 However, the resulting territorial
treaty, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone ("Territorial Sea Convention"),' 8 failed to codify such a stan-
dard limitation. 9 Interestingly, the Convention's Commission
unanimously agreed that international law would not permit an
extension of a state's territorial sea beyond twelve miles. Thus, in
accordance with international law, a state was permitted to claim
as its own territorial waters extending between three and twelve
miles off its coastline.20 Nonetheless, the Commission's failure to
explicitly include this language in the Territorial Sea Convention
frustrated a basic purpose of UNCLOS I, leading to continued
uncertainty over the scope of territorial waters.
14. HARRY N. SCHEIBER, LAW OF THE SEA: THE COMMON HERITAGE AND EMERGING
CHALLENGES xiii (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 2000).
15. See Smith, supra note 7, at 10.
16. See Harry N. Scheiber & Christopher J. Carr, From Extended Jurisdiction to
Privatization: International Law, Biology, and Economics in the Marine Fisheries
Debates, 1937-1976, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 10, 41 (1998) (asserting that many states
claimed 12-mile territorial waters, but in some extreme cases, states claimed over 200
miles).
17. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3159, reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. Int'l L.
Comm'n 253, 265, U.N. Doc. A/3159 [hereinafter Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly].
18. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205.
19. A minority of the convention's commissioners "held that the rule fixing the
breadth at three miles had been widely applied in the past and was still maintained
by a number of important maritime[s]tates, it should, in the absence of any other rule
of equal authority, be regarded as recognized by international law and binding on all
[states]. That view was not supported by the majority of the Commission.... ."Report
of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, supra note 17, at 265-
66.
20. Id.
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Overshadowing this failure was the Territorial Sea Conven-
tion's success in producing the High Seas Fishing Convention.2'
This agreement demonstrated an international awareness of the
problems overfishing presented and the need to encourage conser-
vation of fish stocks on the high seas. 22 In substance, the agree-
ment called for states engaged in fishing for the same stock on the
high seas to enter into negotiations to adopt measures to ensure
conservation of those stocks.2 However, the High Seas Fishing
Convention has been characterized as "very general [and] only
provid[ing] vague obligations"2 4 in large part because the agree-
ment was silent as to what type of measures should be taken in
order to protect the stocks.25 Further, conservation measures were
only allowed if three conditions were met: 1) there was an urgent
need in light of the existing knowledge of the fishery, 2) the mea-
sures adopted were based on scientific findings, and 3) the mea-
sures did not discriminate in form or in fact against foreign
fisherman.26 Thus, the burden was on a state to prove that its fish-
ery was in need of conservation efforts, rather than a presumption
that such efforts were needed to sustain the fishery. While the
High Seas Fishing Convention represented an initial interna-
tional attempt at limiting exploitation of fish stocks on the high
seas, the agreement was not practical because it provided minimal
mechanisms to ensure enforcement.27
2. International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tuna ("ICCAT")
In 1966, ICCAT was established at the Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ICCAT is responsible for the
management and conservation of roughly thirty tuna, or tuna-like
species in the Atlantic Ocean. 28 The Commission undertakes a
21. See High Seas Fishing Convention, supra note 8.
22. See Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 650; Smith, supra note 7, at 11.
23. Smith, supra note 7, at 11.
24. Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 650.
25. See High Seas Fishing Convention, supra note 8, at arts. 2-4. The agreement
concluded that conservation efforts should be measures that "render[] possible the
optimum sustainable yield from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of
food and other marine products ... for human consumption." Id. at art. 2.
26. Id. at art. 7.
27. See High Seas Fishing Convention, supra note 8.
28. A sampling of the HMFS that are of direct concern to ICCAT includes the
Atlantic bluefin, skipjack, yellowfin, albacore, bigeye tuna, and other smaller tuna;
swordfish; and billfish such as white marlin, blue marlin, sailfish, and spearfish. See
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, http:ll
www.iccat.int/en/introduction.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
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wide range of research and studies of SHMFS with "a principal
focus on the effects of fishing on stock abundance."29 At the same
conference, ICCAT prepared and adopted the International Con-
vention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas ("Atlantic Tuna
Convention") 0 The international treaty was formed among coun-
tries with a common interest in protecting Atlantic tuna and other
tuna-like species,3' in order to maintain these stocks at a level
that would allow for the maximum sustainable catch for food and
other purposes.
The Atlantic Tuna Convention directs that the Commission
may establish panels to monitor the health of stock levels on the
basis of species or geographical location.3 Generally, these panels
are composed of a party's delegates and are aided by experts who
specialize in the study of the species of a particular panel's pur-
view.34 The panels make recommendations to the Commission
regarding measures that will preserve the health of a particular
stock. As provided by the treaty, panels receive and analyze data
submitted to them by the parties and submit a biennial proposal
for recommendation to the Commission.35 If the Commission
adopts the recommendation, it becomes binding on all parties six
months after their notification.
The Atlantic Tuna Convention built upon High Seas Fishing
Convention's modest successes and represented a giant step in the
direction of strong international regulation of North Atlantic
SHMFS. The Convention recognized the need to protect such
highly sought-after stocks and endeavored to set international
standards for the management and conservation of the stocks.
However, like the High Seas Fishing Convention, the Atlantic
Tuna Convention was a far cry from the solution to a global
dilemma.
Much of the criticism of the Atlantic Tuna Convention stems
29. Id.
30. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, May 14,
1966, 20 U.S.T. 2887, 673 U.N.T.S. 63 [hereinafter Atlantic Tuna Convention].
31. "The Governments of the following seventeen States were represented:
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, France, Japan,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of South Africa, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
States of America, Uruguay, Venezuela." Id. at para. 3.
32. Id. at pmbl.
33. Id. at art. VI.
34. Id. at R. 12.
35. Id. at art. IX.
36. Id. at art. VIII(2).
2009] 389
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from the agreement's limited jurisdiction. In theory, the area
covered by the agreement seems adequate to protect Atlantic
stocks: the entire Atlantic basin and the adjacent waters to which
tuna species may also migrate. 8 In reality, this area is limited to
waters which are outside of a state's territorial control.39 The Con-
vention disclaims an intention to interfere with a state's jurisdic-
tion over its territorial waters under international law.4' Thus, at
the time of the convention's passage, states maintained complete
control over areas anywhere between three and twelve miles off
their coastline. Consequently, these areas were not capable of
being protected by the Atlantic Tuna Convention. Moreover, with
the aid of satellite tracking devices, it has recently been discov-
ered that tuna in the western Atlantic migrate into the eastern
Mediterranean where they are subjected to higher pressure from
international fishing fleets-and where ICCAT has no
jurisdiction.41
Further weakening the Atlantic Tuna Convention is its direc-
tive that panels must use data received from member states in
their analysis of a particular species.42 Most data collected by
member states are a product of reported catches by commercial
fisherman who are alleged by many scientists of skewing reports
in their favor.43 If the data submitted are in fact inaccurate, and
are used by a panel in its analysis, the resulting proposal for rec-
ommendation will be flawed. This in turn defeats the treaty's goal
of international oversight; because of this failure, those frustrated
by ICCAT's flawed regulations have dubbed it the "International
37. See Smith, supra note 7, at 21.
38. See Atlantic Tuna Convention, supra note 30, at art. I.
39. See Smith, supra note 7, at 21.
40. See Atlantic Tuna Convention, supra note 30, at art. II.
41. See Dorinda Dallmeyer, Fish and Other Migrating Species in the Canada / U.S.
Context, 28 CA.-U.S. L.J. 377-78 (2002).
42. Atlantic Tuna Convention, supra note 30, at annex II ("Agreeing that it is
essential that all countries fishing these Atlantic tuna resources should collect
adequate statistics on catch and fishing effort and the necessary biological data, and
make available for publication the statistical and related economic data with a view to
enabling the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas to
fulfill its functions adequately as soon as it is established.") (emphasis in original).
43. See Mort Rosenblum, Bluefin Tuna Losing Battle for Survival, July 19, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5428979/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2008) ("[Tlhe main
problem is that since ocean fish cannot be accurately counted, no one can be certain
about numbers. As a result, fishermen and conservationists push data to opposite
extremes .... [Iun theory, commercial fishermen should want to protect stocks to
guarantee their own future livelihood. In practice, the experts say, many captains opt
for maximum immediate profit.").
390
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Conspiracy to Catch All Tuna.""
3. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization ("NAFO")
In 1979, NAFO (and its corresponding Convention on Future
Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries) 5
was founded as an intergovernmental fisheries science and man-
agement body, responsible for the conservation of fish stocks on
the high seas.46 NAFO establishes annual total allowable catch
("TAC") regulations that are divided into quotas and allocated to
member states.47 The organization also agrees annually on Con-
servation and Enforcement Measures that include a wide range of
management and control regulations,' a monitoring scheme,49
and inspection and surveillance measures. °
A serious obstacle restricting NAFO's scheme of management
and conservation of SHMFS is the "free-rider problem."5 In prac-
tice, this occurs when foreign fleets not bound by NAFO's regula-
44. Id.
45. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, http://www.nafo.int/about/overview/convention/convention.
pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Northwest Atlantic Convention].
46. Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/
about.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2008) [hereinafter NAFO].
47. Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 656; see also NAFO, supra note 46 ("In 2007,
NAFO ha[d] 12 Members from Central and North America, Europe and Asia. Among
them [were] four coastal members bordering the Convention Area: USA, Canada,
France (in respect of St. Pierre et Miquelon), and Denmark (in respect of Faroe
Islands and Greenland.)").
48. "Control measures include authorization to fish, chartering arrangements,
vessel register, vessel requirements, marking of gear and product labeling
requirements." NAFO, supra note 46. In addition, NAFO establishes "gear
requirements, area and time restrictions, coral protection zones, minimum fish size,
[measures for the conservation and management of sharks,] and by-catch
requirements." Id.
49. "The monitoring of fisheries consists in the recording of catch and stowage,
reporting of catch and fishing effort (by flag states), a satellite-based VMS (Vessel
Monitoring System) for 2-hourly position reports, communication of catches and an
observer program (independent observer on board of every fishing vessel)." Id.
50. "NAFO also has a joint (collaborative) inspections and surveillance scheme in
place under which licensed inspectors board and inspect fishing vessels in
international waters. Furthermore, all vessels landing catches from the Northwest
Atlantic in ports of NAFO member states are submitted to a rigorous and obligatory
port inspection. Finally, NAFO has developed a scheme to prevent IUU fishing by
non-member vessels." Id.
51. Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 657 (citing Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries, U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, art. 6.3 (1995), http://www.fao.
org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm) (last visited Sept. 21, 2008) ("States should
prevent excess fishing capacity and should implement management measures to
ensure that fishing effort is commensurate with the productive capacity of the fishery
resources and their sustainable utilization.").
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2
tions fish in areas under the jurisdiction of the organization. In
this situation, member states' fleets are bound by the organiza-
tion's directives. However, nonmembers are free to disregard them
as they see fit, benefiting from the conservation efforts of the
member states. In an effort to stem this practice, NAFO provides
that all nonmember vessels landing catches from the Northwest
Atlantic in ports of NAFO member states are to be submitted to a
rigorous and obligatory port inspection. 2 If after inspection it is
found that a nonmember vessel has undermined the effectiveness
of the Conservation and Enforcement Measures established by
NAFO,53 the landing and transshipment of the vessel's catch is
prohibited. 4
Another argument against the effectiveness of NAFO's con-
servation efforts is the organization's failure to overcome "political
scheming."55 In order for NAFO to make recommendations to
member states regarding their respective quotas, the figures must
be agreed upon by a majority vote of its members. 6 However, if a
member state objects to its recommended quota it may file a for-
mal objection and is then freed from abiding by the NAFO estab-
lished quota. 7 Political scheming was illustrated on a grand scale
in 1986 when the European Union formally objected to its NAFO
established quota of 700 tons of flounder, and instead netted a
catch of 21,161 tons.58
4. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III
("UNCLOS IIr')
In essence, UNCLOS I codified the freedom of the high seas
tradition. 9 This forced coastal states to rely on regional fishery
management organizations ("RFMO") such as ICCAT and NAFO
52. NAFO Conservation and Enforcement Measures, art. 48, NAFO FC Doc. 08/1
Serial No. N5480, http://www.nafo.int/fisheries/CEM/CEM.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2008).
53. Id. at arts. 46, 50.
54. Id. at art. 50.
55. See Thomas A. Telesca, Sovereignty or the Precautionary Principle: Which Will
Save Our Fish?, 12 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 23, 39-40 (2003).
56. NAFO Rules of Procedure and Financial Regulations, Rules of Procedure for
the General Council, Rule 2.3, http://www.nafo.int/about/overview/convention/rules.
pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
57. See Northwest Atlantic Convention, supra note 45, at art. XII.
58. Telesca, supra note 55, at 40 (citing DAVID HUNTER, JAMES SALZMAN &
DURWOOD ZAELKE, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 127 (2d ed.
Found Press 2002)).
59. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly,
supra note 17, at 265-66.
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to protect fish stocks on the high seas. On paper, this two-headed
regime seemed adequate to protect fish stocks on the high seas. In
reality, the success of ICCAT and NAFO were both extremely lim-
ited due to a host of deficiencies in the organizations' enforcement
mechanisms." This presented an unfortunate dilemma for coastal
states: while they could patrol their own territorial waters for
poaching vessels, under international law, they could only rely on
ICCAT and NAFO to protect stocks on the high seas.
Accordingly, many coastal states began to feel that the inade-
quacy of RFMOs in protecting fish stocks on the high seas would
justify a unilateral extension of territorial waters.
[A]ttention began to shift to possibilities of limited entry in
international fisheries. Here the actors (at least in the first
instance) would be the coastal nations, as they might
extend their offshore limits and exclude foreign-flag fleets
from fishing, or at least subject the foreign vessels to
restrictive controls; in the second instance, the new
restricted zones might also become the arena for limited
entry or other types of economic-efficiency-oriented regula-
tion of domestic-flag vessels as well. Even though little pro-
gress had as yet been made, to the early 1960s, in
legitimization of limited entry principles in evolving inter-
national law, at least the issue of extended jurisdiction
beyond the traditional three-mile offshore limit had become
a focal point of debate and tension, with the possibility of
new opportunities for limited entry policies-or, seen in
other terms, the possibility that limited entry policy might
become an absolute imperative for many coastal nations.
Moreover, with the rising pressure on fisheries in Canadian
and American coastal waters, as the result of increasing
numbers of foreign fleets and rising scale of operations, the
policy imperatives seemed to favor limited entry ideas.6
The practice of unilaterally extending territorial waters
began in South America in 1947 with Chile's ambitious 200-mile
claim." This practice was soon followed by other underdeveloped
60. See Jon L. Jacobson, Symposium: The New Internationalization of North
Pacific Fisheries, 6 WILLAME'rE J. INr' L. & DisP. RESOL. 1, 3-4 (1998)
("[Einforcement of any such rules was not undertaken by the commission itself;
rather, enforcement was the responsibility of the party states. Occasionally, arrest
and seizure by other parties was permitted but ultimately delivery of the arrested
vessel to the flag state was required.").
61. Scheiber & Carr, supra note 16, at 39-40.
62. See Jacobson, supra note 60, at 6 ("The 200-mile limit has its genesis in 1947.
World War IH had just ended and Chileans feared the Europeans and Japanese would
resume whaling off Chile's Southern Coast. Chilean companies had begun whaling in
20091 393
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countries in the 1960s and early 1970s in a desperate attempt to
limit the pillaging of their natural resources. 3 Initially, industrial
states who sought to exploit those resources resisted the unilat-
eral extensions and adhered to the traditional three mile limit.
However, as mounting pressure from domestic and international
fleets strained the health of fish stocks, by 1976 even the United
States extended its territorial jurisdiction to 200 miles.' At this
point, the international community recognized that UNCLOS I
was no longer effective at managing the earth's waters and an
international convention was needed, in part, to settle the territo-
rial waters jurisdictional debate.
In 1982, UNCLOS 11165 resolved the territorial debate by
dividing the earth's waters into three distinct categories: territo-
rial waters, an exclusive economic zone ("EEZ"), and high seas.6
Territorial waters were extended from three miles to twelve
miles, 7 and an EEZ was created which extended from the coast-
line outward 200 miles. 8 As was tradition, states retained virtu-
ally complete control over territorial waters and no control over
the high seas.69 However, UNCLOS III gave states exclusive
rights for the exploration, exploitation, management, and conser-
vation of living and non-living resources within the newly created
200 mile EEZ.7 °
the absence of competing interests and the industry did not want competition to
return.").
63. Id.; see also Scheiber & Carr, supra note 16, at 41.
64. Scheiber & Carr, supra note 16, at 41.
65. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS III].
66. Id.; see also Smith supra note 7, at 12; Mack, supra note 6, at 317. In the
interest of accuracy, but not relevant to this discussion, UNCLOS III also established
two other categories of waters: the Contiguous Zone, and the Continental Shelf. See
UNCLOS III, supra note 65, at arts. 33, 76. The contiguous zone can extend an
additional twelve miles from the boundaries of a state's territorial waters, but cannot
exceed twenty-four miles from shore. Within the contiguous zone, a nation can act to
prevent violations of its environmental, customs, fiscal, or immigration laws, or to
apprehend vessels suspected of violating them. Id. On the other hand, the
Continental Shelf's boundaries "shall not exceed 350 nautical miles from the
baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed
100 nautical miles from the 2,500 [meter] isobath, which is a line connecting the
depth of 2,500 [meters]." Id.
67. UNCLOS III, supra note 65, at art. 3.
68. Id. at art. 57.
69. Telesca, supra note 55, at 38 ("Article 87 of the UNCLOS asserts Grotius's
freedom of the seas doctrine. It states that the high seas are open to all States,
whether coastal or land-locked.") (citations omitted) (quotations omitted).
70. UNCLOS III, supra note 65, at art. 56(1). Specifically, the agreement directs
that within the EEZ a coastal state shall determine the TAC of living resources
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The introduction of an EEZ into international law added a
significant weapon to Canada's arsenal for the protection of its
distressed fish stocks. When combined, the EEZ and territorial
waters account for 40% of the world's oceans and 90% of its
marine resources." Accordingly, the jurisdictional areas carved
out by UNCLOS III allowed Canada much greater control over
fish stocks off its coasts. However, like many of its predecessors,
the agreement failed in large part to codify proactive measures
designed to regulate SHMFS, and thus the agreement alone was
unable to adequately protect those stocks.
UNCLOS III hinted at the idea of multilateral regulation and
conservation efforts for SHMFS, but stopped short of taking the
actual measures necessary to accomplish these objectives.72
Instead, UNCLOS III endorsed the establishment of RFMOs such
as ICCAT and NAFO.73 The agreement directed that states had a
duty to cooperate in good faith to set up management measures
with other states engaged in the fishing for SHMFS.74 However,
the duty to cooperate was not clarified further by the agreement,
and its vagueness resulted in states choosing not to cooperate in
the regulation of SHMFS. 5 Moreover, it should be noted that
while UNCLOS III endorsed RFMOs, it did nothing to bolster the
enforcement provisions of those organizations already in place.
This deficiency can be summarized as follows:
On the high seas, vessels were only accountable to the flag
state and laws imposed on them by the flag state. If a
regional management organization developed such rules
within the zone's boundaries; it shall ensure the proper conservation and
management of resources while taking into account the best scientific evidence
available; conservation and management measures shall be designed to restore
populations of distressed fish to their maximum sustainable yield and shall protect
stocks whose levels may become seriously threatened; and finally, the agreement
provides that all scientific information on the levels of fish stocks shall be contributed
and exchanged regularly through international organizations. Id. at art. 61(1-5).
71. Mack, supra note 6 (citing Jon L. Jacobson, Symposium: Law of the Sea:
International Fisheries Law in the Year 2010, 45 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1179 (1985); Alison
Rieser, A.S.I.L. Observer Comments on UN Conference on Straddling and Migratory
Fish Stocks, A.S.I.L. NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1993, at 12.).
72. "The problems of straddling and migratory fish stocks were known to the
participants of UNCLOS III, but their conservation was not seen as urgent." Atlantic
Tuna Convention, supra note 30, at art. VI; Mack, supra note 6, at 317-18 (citing
Statement made by the Chairman of the Conference at the Opening of the
Organizations Session, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/7 (1993)).
73. See Mack, supra note 6, at 317-18.
74. UNCLOS III supra note 65, at arts. 63, 64, 118.
75. See Mack, supra note 6, at 318 (citing Background Paper Prepared by
Secretariat, at 22-25, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.164/INF/5 (1993)).
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for its members, each member could participate in inspec-
tion or surveillance of all others. But once a violation was
found, flag states alone had the ability to prosecute the
offender. Member states were usually unwilling to give
other states the authority to take action against violators.
Consequently, sanctions and prosecutions were not always
carried through.76
As this excerpt illustrates, UNCLOS III perpetuated the status
quo of ineffective enforcement provisions of RFMOs.
While UNCLOS III's progressive jurisdictional scheme
allowed a state to exercise exclusive control of natural resources
further from its coasts, a glaring problem associated with the
UNCLOS I three-mile territorial limitation remained unsolved:
highly migratory fish stocks habitually swim out of not only terri-
torial waters but also EEZs, and into the unprotected high seas
where their capture is unregulated. Canada's struggle to protect
SHMFS off its Atlantic Coast did not end with the passage of
UNCLOS III, and in fact would continue into the 1990s.
5. United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks ("Fish Stocks
Agreement")
Before discussion of the final international agreement aimed
at protecting SHMFS, the two categories of stocks should be dif-
ferentiated in order to better understand the challenges the spe-
cies present.
First, straddling stocks, such as cod, represent fish whose
habitat straddles the EEZ and the high seas, the area
beyond the control of the EEZ. Second, highly migratory
species, including tuna and swordfish, delineate fish that
may traverse the waters of several nations as well as the
high seas.77
During the late 1980s and 1990s, Canada watched as interna-
tional fleets ravaged North Atlantic cod stocks just outside its
EEZ. Soon, the State feared that other straddling stocks would
follow the same route of devastation as cod stocks had.7" In 1995,
76. Mack, supra note 6, at 322-23 (citations omitted).
77. Telesca, supra note 55, at 37 (citations omitted).
78. See Anne Swardson, Canada Fires Warning Shots; Seizes Spanish Fishing
Boat, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995, available at http://tech.mit.eduNV115/N10
canada. 10w.html.
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Canada's passivity in allowing the depletion of its cod stocks
turned to aggressive actions taken in defense of the turbot.
The turbot is straddling stock, widely recognized as a substi-
tute for cod. "It is a slime-bodied bottom-feeder-a putrid-colored
fish with ugly, raised eyes that Canadian supermarkets can
hardly give away. Not the sort of prize, then, that would normally
be expected to bring two nations to the verge of open warfare on
the high seas."79 However, this stock had been the target of a
Spanish trawler's illegal nets80 just outside Canada's EEZ. The
trawler was spotted by a Canadian reconnaissance aircraft and
naval gunships were immediately dispatched to intercept the ves-
sel. When the vessel became aware that gunships were rapidly
approaching, it cut its nets free and began evasive maneuvers in
an attempt to escape its pursuers. The trawler was eventually
persuaded to stop when the Canadian gunships fired warning
shots across its bow. The Spanish vessel was then boarded, the
captain and crew were arrested, and the boat was towed back to
the Newfoundland port of St. John's where it was detained."
At this point, it was apparent to the international community
that UNCLOS III's regulatory scheme for the conservation and
management of SHMFS was completely unworkable. In an effort
to prevent a much more serious conflict, a United Nations Earth
Summit was held to create an agreement which was capable of
substantially eliminating disputes arising from the fishing of
these stocks. After over two years of intense international negotia-
tions, the result of the conference was the Fish Stocks
Agreement. 2
79. John DeMont et al, Canada Seizes Spanish Boat, MACLEAN'S MAG., Mar. 20,
1995, available at http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&
Params=M1ARTMOO10344.
80. The illegality of driftnets has been summarized as follows: "[d]uring the time
period between the 1982 Convention and the Earth Summit, there was a large-scale
problem with high seas driftnets, especially those placed by Taiwan, Korea, and
Japan. These nets were used, among other places, in the North Pacific to fish for
squid. These techniques were accused [of being] and eventually labeled [as the] 'strip
mining of the seas,' or at least the upper layer of the sea. While targeting squid,
videos were taken showing driftnets killing salmon and injuring mammals and sea
birds. This emotional issue led to the so-called United Nations moratorium on
driftnets. The United Nations General Assembly did not establish a ban on large-
scale high seas driftnet fishing, but urged countries to adopt a ban by the end of
1992." Jacobson, supra note 60, at 8-9 (quotations omitted) (citations omitted).
81. See generally Swardson, supra note 78; DeMont et al., supra note 79.
82. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention of the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Dec. 4,
1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 [hereinafter Fish Stocks Agreement].
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The Fish Stocks Agreement has been heralded as an interna-
tional environmental achievement." The agreement corrects the
flaws of UNCLOS III in two main respects. First, the Fish Stocks
Agreement provides for mandatory membership in RFMOs. To
achieve this, the agreement directs that where a RFMO has been
established to regulate SHMFS on the high seas, any state fishing
for those stocks must become a member of that RFMO, or must
agree to abide by its conservation and management measures.8
Further, any states that choose not to become members of a
RFMO, or who do not abide by its regulations, are not permitted
access to the stocks that the organization regulates.85 Second, and
most importantly, the agreement strengthens RFMOs by explic-
itly providing for their enforcement. The treaty authorizes a
coastal state's enforcement and surveillance agents86 to board,
inspect, arrest, and begin judicial proceedings against a vessel and
its crew if a coastal state suspects violations.87
These specific directives are revolutionary in that they "dras-
tically alter[] the traditional idea of freedom of the high seas."88
The centuries-old notion that no state enjoyed property rights on
the high seas was limited in order to, as the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment determined, "ensure the long-term conservation and sus-
tainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks." 9 Moreover, the agreement demonstrates a gradual shift
toward an acceptance of the "precautionary approach"9" in the con-
servation and management of SHMFS. In essence, this approach
"aims to prevent irreversible damage to the environment by
implementing strict conservations measures, even in the absence
of scientific evidence that environmental degradation is being
caused by human intervention."91 Thus, the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment represents an international awareness of the damages
overfishing has caused SHMFS, and a pact to err on the side of
conservation when harvesting those stocks.
83. Telesca, supra note 55, at 42.
84. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 82, at art. 8(3).
85. Id. at arts. 8(4), 17(2).
86. Telesca, supra note 55, at 42 ("in the United States, Coast Guard officers").
87. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 82, at art. 21(1).
88. Mack, supra note 6, at 326.
89. Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 82, at intro.
90. See generally Telesca, supra note 55.
91. Id. at 43 (quotations omitted) (citing Victor R. Restrepo et al., The
Precautionary Approach: A New Paradigm, or Business as Usual?, in OUR LVING
OCEANS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF U.S. LIVING MARiNE RESOURCES 2 (1999),
available at http://spo.nwr.noaa.gov/fal.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2008)).
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B. Canadian regulation
1. The Department of Fisheries and Oceans ("DFO") and
the Oceans Act
In 1985, Canada's DFO was established with the passage of
the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act.92 The Act directs
that the DFO, and its appointed minister, are responsible for the
oversight of all aspects of fisheries, harbors, marine sciences, and
government programs and policy in respect to oceans. 93 The man-
agement scheme of the Act grants the minister broad authority to
manage Canadian waters;9 4 however, the minister's main function
is to enforce international law.
After the passage of UNCLOS III and the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment, the Canadian Government resolved to "affirm in Canadian
domestic law Canada's sovereign rights, jurisdiction and responsi-
bilities in the exclusive economic zone of Canada ... [and to] pro-
mote [] the wide application of the precautionary approach to the
conservation, management and exploitation of marine resources
... . ,95 The Oceans Act 96 of 1996 codified these objectives, and
expanded the power of the minister to enforce international law
via domestic law.9" "That is, the Act [gave] DFO sufficient flexibil-
ity and authority to lead Canadian fisheries management in com-
pliance with the mandates and principles of UNCLOS, the Fish
Stocks Agreement, NAFO, [and other RFMOs] ....
92. Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act, R.S.C., ch. F-15 (1985) (Can.),
available at http:/laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/F-15.
93. See id. ch. F-15(4).
94. See Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 659.
95. Oceans Act, R.S.C., ch. 31, pmbl. (1996) (Can.) (emphasis added), available at
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showtdm/cs/O-2.4.
96. See generally id.
97. See Fagenholz, supra note 9, at 660-61 ("[Tlhe Oceans Act clearly provides a
statutory mandate that Canada manage its fisheries in compliance with ecosystem-
wide and precautionary approaches, as required by international law . .. [Tihe
domestic Oceans Act provides sufficiently broad authority to DFO to increasingly
assume a directorial, executive management role by ensuring that departments and
policies are complementary and that efforts are coordinated. The text of the Act
provides support for the conclusion that Parliament's intent was for DFO to lead
progressive reform of fisheries regulation, and intentions of legislators provide
statutes with meaning.").
98. Id. at 661.
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2. Species At Risk Act ("SARA") and the Committee on
the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
("COSEWIC")
Intent on showing its dedication to the preservation of its eco-
systems, Canada became the first western industrialized state to
ratify the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,
another important agreement that came out of the 1992 Earth
Summit.99 The Convention on Biological Diversity was established
for the purpose of achieving three main goals: "the conservation of
biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the
fair and equitable sharing of the benefits from the use of genetic
resources." 10 These efforts were not entirely successful.
On ratification of that treaty, Canada pledged to provide
"effective protection" for Canadian species at risk and the
critical habitat and ecosystems on which they depend. Ten
years passed, and despite repeated promises to the Cana-
dian public, overwhelming public support, and several
failed attempts Canada was still without legal protection
for its 415 species at risk. 1'
In 2003, ten years after signing the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Canada took a step towards meeting the goals of the
Convention by enacting SARA.
102
SARA's principal contribution to Canada's conservation
efforts was its establishment of COSEWIC. This is an indepen-
dent body0 3 comprised of both wildlife experts and scientists,
whose purpose is to "assess the status of each wildlife species con-
sidered by COSEWIC to be at risk,"1°4 and "identify existing and
potential threats to [those] species."0 5 Upon the assessment of a
particular species, COSEWIC is responsible for issuing a report to
99. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/legallcbd-un-en.pdf, Canada's Species
at Risk Act (SARA), Wilderness Committee, http://www.wildernesscommittee.org/
campaigns/wildlife/campaigns/wildlife/readers/sara/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2008)
[hereinafter Wilderness Committee].
100. Sustaining Life on Earth, Convention on Biological Diversity, http:l
www.cbd.int/convention/guide.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2008).
101. Wilderness Committee, supra note 99.
102. Species at Risk Act, 2002 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.), available at http://www.sara
registry.gc.ca/approachlact/sara-e.pdf.
103. "The members are not, because of being a member, part of the public service of
Canada." Id. at ch. 29(16)(4)).
104. Id. at 29(15)(1)(a).
105. Id. at ch. 29(15)(1)(a).
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the Minister of the Environment, 06 and he must, "within 90 days,
include in the public registry a [detailed] report on how [he]
intends to respond to the assessment." 7 If the Minister chooses to
add the species to Canada's List of Wildlife Species at Risk 08 as an
extirpated, endangered, or threatened species, SARA protects it
from being killed, harmed, harassed, captured, or taken. 10 9
Critics of SARA have complained that "the act is a paper
tiger, reliant on political will, discretionary wording and largely
unenforceable habitat provisions.""' This is so partly because the
assessment of a threatened species is only undertaken at the will
of COSEWIC. If the board chooses not to perform an assessment,
then the species remains unprotected. Moreover, even if the spe-
cies is put on the List of Wildlife Species at Risk, critics suggest
that no steps are taken to preserve the "critical habitat" of that
species as directed by SARA,"' which essentially defeats the pur-
poses of the species' protection.12
Recently, these issues came to a head that resulted in the fil-
ing of a lawsuit by six environmental groups from across Canada,
claiming that the DFO failed to protect the critical habitat of two
populations of Orcas that reside in British Columbia coastal
waters."
On September 10, without consulting killer whale
scientists, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans
declined to issue an order under the federal Species at Risk
Act to protect the resident killer whales' critical habitat
from destruction.
The department issued a statement claiming that resi-
dent killer whale critical habitat is protected by existing
laws and policies.
106. Id. at ch. 29(25)(1).
107. Id. at ch. 29(25)(3)(1).
108. Canada's List of Wildlife Species at Risk, Species at Risk Public Registry,
http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/species/schedules-e.cfm?id=l (last visited Feb. 20,
2009).
109. Species at Risk Act ch. 29(32)(1).
110. See Wilderness Committee, supra note 99.
111. See Species at Risk Act, at ch. 29(11)(2)(d).
112. See Canada Sued for Failure to Protect Killer Whale Habitat, ENV'T NEWS
SERVICE, Oct. 8, 2008, httpJ/www.ens-newswire.com/ens/oct2008/2008-10-08-03.asp
("Bill Wareham, [the] senior marine conservation specialist at the David Suzuki
Foundation, said, 'To truly protect killer whales' critical habitat, Canada needs to
legally protect areas that serve the killer whales' basic needs for food and rest.
Comprehensive marine use plans that include new protected areas are essential, if we
hope to recover populations of these magnificent whales.'").
113. See id.
2009] 401
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:2
These killer whales are attempting to survive despite
decreasing numbers of salmon; increased boat traffic; toxic
contamination; and noise from dredging, seismic testing
and military sonar.
Frustrated by the federal government's failure to take
steps under the Species at Risk Act to protect the orcas, the
David Suzuki Foundation, Environmental Defence, Green-
peace Canada, the International Fund for Animal Welfare,
the Raincoast Conservation Society and the Wilderness
Committee have turned to the courts.
"Department of Fisheries and Oceans' decision not to
protect critical habitat of resident killer whales is sympto-
matic of the federal government's widespread failure to
implement the Species at Risk Act," said Gwen Barlee, pol-
icy director of the Wilderness Committee. "BC's endan-
gered species deserve better."114
While SARA has not proven to be Canada's end-all to contro-
versy arising from its domestic regulation of fish stocks, it has
pointed the ship in the right direction. It moves Canada away
from its roots of passivity towards a more comprehensive scheme
for the management and conservation of SHMFS. Canada once
relied on lax international law to protect these stocks which lead
to the eventual annihilation of many of its most prized fish stocks.
However, Canada now enforces a combination of international
and domestic law which is better suited to manage these problem-
atic stocks. The early success of this management system has been
clearly evidenced by the recent resurgence of the North Atlantic
swordfish fishery.
III. CASE STUDY: NORTH ATLANTIC SWORDFISH FISHERY
The Broadbill Swordfish (Xiphias gladius) is a deep-water,
highly migratory fish whose catch was once almost unsalable.1 5
Today the swordfish is a delicacy to many consumers and a high
value catch to fisherman, adding an important revenue source to
coastal states all over the world." ' Accordingly, by the late 1990s
the growing demand for swordfish meat resulted in the overfish-
114. Id.
115. See Malia Schwartz, Deborah Grossman-Garber & Henry Milliken, Rhode
Island Sea Grant Fact Sheet, Swordfish, http://seagrant.gso.uri.edulfactsheets
swordfish.html (last vistited Oct. 13, 2008).
116. Indian Ocean Tuna Commission [IOTC], Peter Ward & Sue Elscot, Broadbill
Swordfish: Status of World Fisheries, 3 IOTC PROC. 208, 209 (2000), available at
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2000/wpb/IOTC-2000-WPB-08.pdf [hereinafter
Ward & Elscot].
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ing of the North Atlantic swordfish stock to the verge of extinction.
However, recent data suggest a reversal in the historical trend of
depletion towards a healthy and sustainable North Atlantic
swordfish fishery. This resurgence is directly traceable to the inte-
gration of stricter Canadian and international regulations
imposed upon the fishery, and represents a glimpse of the success
such measures can have when implemented. This article urges
Canada and the international community to apply similar mea-
sures for the protection and preservation of many other struggling
North Atlantic SHMFS.
A. Swordfish Characteristics: The Prince of Darkness
In order to understand the swordfish's attractiveness to com-
mercial fisherman, it is necessary to begin the case study with a
brief discussion of the fish's characteristics. Like other billfish, the
swordfish is a fecund, highly migratory fish, inhabiting most of
the tropical and temperate oceans of the world.117 The swordfish is
not a schooling fish. It moves alone with ocean currents, using its
long sword-like bill to slash and kill its prey. The swordfish princi-
pally feeds at night, feasting on squid, herring, mackerel, menha-
den, and various other small fish.11 Unique to the swordfish is a
retina heating tissue that insulates its eyes, keeping them warm
and functional in very frigid waters. Because of this heating appa-
ratus, the swordfish is able to stalk its prey throughout the water
column, either in shallow waters or at depths below 300 meters, 19
thus earning its nickname, "the prince of darkness." Female
swordfish grow faster and larger than males and can weigh as
much as 1,200 pounds. 120 These fish reach sexual maturity
between their second and third year and thereafter spawn multi-
ple times a year.121
B. The History of Harvesting: From Harpoons to
Longlines
The practice of swordfishing began thousands of years ago in
subtropical regions as a near-shore subsistence activity. The early
117. Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 8.
118. See Smith, supra note 7, at 8; Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209.
119. See Emma Young, Swordfish Heat Their Eyes for the Hunt, NEwScIENTIST,
Jan. 10, 2005, available at httpJ/www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=DN6861.
120. Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209; see also Smith, supra note 7, at 8.
121. See Schwartz et al., supra note 115; National Marine Fisheries Service,
FishWatch, Life History and Habitat, httpJ/www.nmfs.noaa.gov/fishwatch/species/
n atl swordfish.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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method of harvesting swordfish primarily involved harpooning
large female swordfish found basking at the sea surface.122 This
harpooning practice is believed to have begun in the North Atlan-
tic in the early 19th century off the coast of New England."3
Harpooning is an extremely efficient method of catching large
swordfish in that it allows a fisherman to estimate the size of a
fish before undertaking its landing. However, this tactic proved
excessively time consuming for commercial purposes as it only
allowed a fisherman to catch one swordfish at a time.
The solution to harpooning was discovered in the 1950s with
the development of the commercial longline vessel. 24 Longlining is
a method whereby a vessel floats a cable stretching up to eighty
miles across the surface of the ocean. The cable subsequently sus-
pends thousands of lines which dangle at different depths in the
water column and are tipped with baited hooks. 25 This allowed
commercial fisherman who were once limited to harpooning a sin-
gle basking fish to catch numerous swordfish at once. 26 However,
in comparison to the early practice of harpooning, longlining is
highly inefficient. When deployed, the unmanned longline indis-
criminately hook any organism that takes its bait, including
undersized swordfish and completely undesired "bycatch" species
such as sea turtles, marlin, and shark. 127 Most by-catch instinc-
tively struggle to free themselves from the hooks until they expire,
which in turn leads to the eventual discard of a total of twenty-
seven million tons of by-catch a year. 28
Longline vessels targeting swordfish are able to chill the fish
on ice for extended periods after catch as the meat has good stor-
age qualities and its price is less sensitive to product quality than
many other prize fish. 129 Because of these characteristics, "[firesh-
chill longline fisheries [targeting] swordfish exhibit a development
pattern where the risk-takers in the fleet progressively move fur-
ther offshore, initially taking high catch rates. Other longliners
122. Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209.
123. See Smith, supra note 7, at 8 (citing National Marine Fisheries Service, Draft
Fishery Management Plan for Atlantic Tunas, Swordfish, and Sharks including an
Environmental Assessment and Regulatory Impact Review 6-80 (1998)).
124. See Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209.
125. See, e.g., Telesca, supra note 55, at 27.
126. Smith, supra note 7, at 8.
127. See id. at 8-9; Telesca, supra note 55, at 27.
128. See Telesca, supra note 55, at 27 (citing COLIN WOODARD, OCEAN'S END (Basic
Books 2000)).
129. See Ward & Elscot, supra note 116, at 209.
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follow and the fleet ranges further offshore for longer trips . "..."130
Thus, as vessels developed the capabilities to fish further from
their home states, foreign longline vessels flocked to the North
Atlantic in search of abundant swordfish stocks. A scientist from
the University of British Columbia best characterized this
sequence of events as "a hole burning through paper. As the hole
expands, the edge is where the fisheries concentrate until there is
nowhere left to go."'31 In support of this conclusion, ICCAT esti-
mated catch data suggests that in 1955 Canada landed over 77%
of the total catch of 3,502 tons of North Atlantic swordfish. 132 By
1970, Canada's share in the total catch had been reduced by 27%
to 50%, while total landings of North Atlantic swordfish increased
by over 63%, to 9,495 tons. 3
As previously discussed, UNCLOS III was adopted in 1982
and created a 200 mile EEZ.13 1 Applying the Convention's direc-
tives, Canada was empowered to regulate a vast new area of
highly depleted fishing grounds. However, swordfish and other
SHMFS typically live in deep waters located outside of any state's
EEZ. Accordingly, plundering of the North Atlantic swordfish
stocks continued throughout the late 1980s, reaching its peak
level in 1987 with thirteen countries combining to report a total
catch of 20,236 tons of swordfish. 135 This staggering catch was
completely unsustainable and levels dwindled in subsequent
years. By the passage of the Fish Stocks Agreement in 1995, catch
levels for North Atlantic swordfish had dropped to a rate of 16,844
tons. 36 The data were particularly alarming as efforts to target
130. Id. at 210 (An example of this development is seen in the "Hawaii-based
longliners . .. [who] regularly make trips of more than 30 days. They venture 1000-
2000 nm from port and average about 250 days at sea per year.").
131. National Geographic News, Big-Fish Stocks Fall 90 Percent Since 1950, Study
Says, May 15, 2003, http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/05/0515_030515
fishdecline.html.
132. ICCAT, Report of the 2006 Atlantic Swordfish Stock Assessment Session,
ICCAT Doc. SCI-040/2006, at 19 (Sept. 4-8, 2006) (estimating Canada to be
responsible for landing 2,722 tons out of a total 3,502 tons) [hereinafter 2006
Swordfish Stock Assessment].
133. Id. In 1955, it is estimated that only three countries targeted the North
Atlantic swordfish: Canada, the United States of America, and Spain. By 1970, nine
other states had joined, including Chinese Taipei, Cuba, Portugal, Japan, Korea,
Morocco, Norway, U.S.S.R., and Venezuela. Id.
134. See Scheiber & Carr, supra note 16, at 41.
135. ICCAT, SuMMARY: REPORT OF THE 2006 ATLANTIC SWORDFISH STOCK
ASSESSMENT SESSION 89 (2006). http://www.iccat.int/Documents/SCRS/ExecSum/
SWO-ATL1%20EN.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) [hereinafter SUMMARY: REPORT OF
THE 2006 SWORDFISH ASSESSMENT].
136. See 2006 Swordfish Stock Assessment, supra note 132, at 20.
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the swordfish had not decreased. In fact, two more countries had
joined in the hunt since 1987, bringing the total to fifteen coun-
tries specifically targeting the swordfish in the North Atlantic."'
C. Recent Developments in the North Atlantic
Swordfish Fishery
The Fish Stocks Agreement made ICCAT's 1995 TAC quotas
mandatory on all vessels which were harvesting swordfish in the
North Atlantic.' Despite the mandate, the effectiveness of the
quota was not immediately apparent. A marked decrease in total
catch levels was not seen until 1997, two years after the passage
of the Fish Stocks Agreement. In that year the total reported
North Atlantic catch was 12,997 tons, representing a 14.3% drop
in catch from the previous year.3 9 Despite the fishery's slow reac-
tion to ICCAT mandated TAC quotas, a global awareness of the
damages caused by overfishing was born out of the enforcement of
the TAC quotas, and many states began taking unilateral actions
in an effort to protect the fishery.
1. Canadian Efforts
In defense of the swordfish, Canada adopted an "overall con-
servation objective ... to ensure that Canada's role in supporting
the conservation and sustainability objectives of the ICCAT inter-
national stock management regime is achieved." 140 To that end,
Canada has been aggressive in the enforcement of ICCAT's
domestic swordfish quota and in the defence of its 200 mile EEZ. A
recent example was seen on September 23, 2008, when a Cana-
dian surveillance aircraft spotted Captain Linda Greenlaw 4 1 and
her 67-foot longline vessel, "Sea Hawk," fishing for swordfish
137. Id.
138. See DEPARTMENT OF FISHERIES AND OCEANS, CANADIAN ATLANTIC SWORDFISH
AND OTHER TUNAS: 2004-2006 INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT PLAN, ch. 3.1, available at
http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/communic/fishman/ifmp/swordfish/index-e.htm (last
visited Sept. 23, 2008) ("The first national allocations to ICCAT Contracting Parties
were made for 1995 and went to those member countries with a history of fishing
swordfish, namely.. ." the European Union (most notably Spain and Portugal), the
United States of America, Canada, and Japan.) [hereinafter DFO 2004-2006
Swordfish Plan]; ICCAT, Recommendation by ICCAT Relating to the Rebuilding
Program for North Atlantic Swordfish (June 3, 2003), http://www.iccat.intl
Documents/Recs/compendiopdf-e2002-02-e.pdf.
139. See 2006 Swordfish Stock Assessment, supra note 132, at 20
140. See DFO 2004-2006 SWORDFISH PLAN, supra note 138, at ch. 6.1.2.
141. Linda Greenlaw is famous for her novel "The Hungry Ocean" as well as the
portrayal of her in the recent blockbuster movie, "The Perfect Storm."
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inside Canada's EEZ. Canadian Department of Fisheries and
Oceans officers boarded the vessel at sea, and arrested Green-
law.142 An account of what occurred post-arrest is as follows:
According to the DFO, the 210-foot Canadian Coast Guard
ship Cygnus escorted Sea Hawk into St. John's, Newfound-
land, early on Friday. Greeted by a hoard of media, a hand-
cuffed Greenlaw later appeared in the Provincial Court on
charges of violating Canada's Coastal Fisheries Protection
Act. She was released on $10,000 (Canadian) cash bail, and
ordered to return to court on Oct. 27. The Sea Hawk and its
catch of swordfish were released on $55,000 bond and
reported sailed for Fairhaven [Massachusetts]. 43
Recently, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has also
limited the timeframe of the swordfish season. The fishery tradi-
tionally operated from April until December, 44 but starting in
1999, has ended in August due to reduced quota.
45
2. U.S. Efforts
By the late 1990s U.S. environmental groups such as SeaWeb
and the Natural Resources Defense Council identified the sword-
fish as "one of the most popular restaurant species that many
chefs and consumers are familiar with . .. emblematic of the
problems facing marine fish, including ineffective management,
overfishing, destructive gear, and by-catch.' 4 6 Accordingly, in
1998 these conservation groups began a campaign entitled "Give
Swordfish a Break!" to "implement[ I adequate recovery measures
for north Atlantic swordfish, [in order to create] a model that may
be replicated for other depleted fish." 4 The campaign's method
was simple and effective: ask chefs to take swordfish off their
menus.
Incredibly, Give Swordfish a Break! brought about significant
public awareness and mobilized the U.S. government to consider
closures of swordfish nursery areas in U.S. waters. This consider-
142. See Stephen Rappaport, Canada Busts Linda Greenlaw; Territorial Waters
Issues Emerge, THE ELLSWORTH AMERICAN, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://ellsworth
maine.com/site/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id=17139&Itemid=85.
143. Id. (Interestingly, there was an NBC camera crew aboard the vessel at the
time of its seizure documenting the trip for an upcoming reality T.V. series on
swordfishing in the North Atlantic.).
144. See DFO 2004-2006 SWORDFISH PLAN, supra note 138, at ch. 3.3.
145. See 2006 Swordfish Stock Assessment, supra note 132, at 2.
146. SeaWeb, Give Swordfish a Break! Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.seaweb.org/programs/swordfish/swordfaq.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).
147. Id.
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ation was also effectuated by the 1999 case, Center for Marine
Conservation v. National Marine Fisheries Service.148 This was an
action brought by a conservation group alleging that Hawaiian
longline fisherman were killing leatherback sea turtles as by-
catch, in violation of the Endangered Species Act.149 The District
Court hearing the matter issued an injunction ordering the
National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") to "make the appro-
priate time and area closures [of Hawaiian waters] based upon the
greatest benefit to the sea turtles and considering the costs to the
Hawaii-based pelagic longline fishery."15 ° This decision repre-
sented an enormous blow to the U.S. longline swordfish fishery. In
an effort to stem other time consuming lawsuits, NMFS enacted
similar closures in 2001 that cordoned off most of the fertile Grand
Banks off the Newfoundland coast to U.S. swordfishing vessels, in
the process cutting New England's 2001 landings by 30% to 800
metric tons.15
3. E.U. and Japanese Efforts
By 2006, Spanish longline vessels had switched to almost
exclusive use of mono-filament lines, from the traditional multifi-
lament lines. 52 Monofilament provides a dual advantage to fisher-
man in that it yields higher catch rates due to its low visibility in
water, and also reduces incidental by-catch of toothy predators
such as sharks as they are able to easily bite through the line.'53
Further evidencing a shift in the fishery, Spain's 2005 North
Atlantic landings were reported at 5,521 tons, a 21% decline from
the peak landings reported in 1995.1" Spain's European Union
counterpart in North Atlantic swordfishing, Portugal, has also
seen a shift in its North Atlantic fleet's practices towards becom-
ing more of a multi-species fishery. This is due to changes in the
148. Center for Marine Conservation v. National Marine Fisheries Service, No. 99-
0152, 1999 WL 33594330 (D. Haw. Nov. 23, 1999).
149. Id. at *2; see also generally Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, ch. 35
(2000).
150. See Center for Marine Conservation, 1999 WL 33594330, at *2.
151. See Seafood Business Magazine, Buyers Guide: Swordfish (2000), available at
http://www.seafoodbusiness.com/buyersguide03/ssue-sword.htm (last visited Mar.
15, 2009).
152. See 2006 Swordfish Stock Assessment, supra note 132, at 2-3
153. See Heather H. Stone & Langille K. Dixon, A comparison of catches of
swordfish, Xiphias gladius, and other pelagic species from Canadian longline gear
configured with alternating monofilament and multifilament nylon gangions -
Statistical Data Included, FISHERY BULLETIN, Jan. 2001, available at http:fl
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOFDG/is-1_99/ai_73023332/pgl ?tag=artBody;coll.
154. See 2006 Swordfish Stock Assessment, supra note 132, at 4.
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market price of swordfish and increases in the price of other spe-
cies such as sharks.
15
Between the period of February 2000 and December 2003, all
Japanese longline vessels fishing in the North Atlantic were
required to release or discard all swordfish, given that Japanese
quotas had been met. 156 At the conclusion of this period, the Japa-
nese government requested that Japanese longline vessels con-
tinue releasing their live catch, but allowed vessels to retain their
dead catch.157 The result of this moratorium was seen in the form
of dwindling catch levels, as estimated landings in 2000 of 1090
tons decreased to 324 tons in 2005.158
D. Current Health of the North Atlantic Swordfish
Stock
The latest ICCAT swordfish assessment was published in
2006 and represents the most accurate and up to date scientific
data available on the species. 15 9 This assessment found that the
2006 North Atlantic catch of 11,814 tons represented a 42%
decrease in catch levels since the 1987 peak, and is consistent
with the 11,600 ton average seen in the past decade. 6 ° The data
collected also suggest that spawning biomass began a pattern of
increase in the mid 1990s and progressed into the late 1990s. In
2006, swordfish biomass was estimated to be about 99% of the bio-
mass needed to produce the fishery's maximum sustainable
yield. 6' "Although there is some uncertainty in these estimates,
the stock trajectory ... shows that the status of North Atlantic
swordfish is close to [ICCAT's] objectives . "..."162 The 2006 report
confirms that through the implementation of a combined domestic
and international regulatory scheme, "it is likely that the North
Atlantic swordfish stock is nearly rebuilt to the maximum sustain-
able yield."1"
155. Id.
156. Id. at 5.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See SuMMARY: REPORT OF THE 2006 SWORDFISH ASSESSMENT, supra note 135, at
89-90.
161. Id. at 90.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Canada's once abundant tides are depleted; the "fish are gone
and the seas, streams and rivers lie quiet and empty."164 A half-
century of domestic and international regulatory failures has
aided in the devastation of the fish stocks in the waters off of
Canada's eastern coast. However, the resurgence of the North
Atlantic swordfish demonstrates that distressed SHMFS are capa-
ble of being nurtured back to sustainable levels through the
enforcement of a combined domestic and international regulatory
scheme.
Domestically, Canada must continue its vigilant enforcement
of RFMOs' TAC quotas rendered mandatory by the Fish Stocks
Agreement. 165 The swordfish case study illustrates that ICCAT's
TAC quotas have been extremely effective at nurturing a severely
distressed fishery back to health. Following this example, Canada
should continue to enforce domestic TAC quotas set by other
RFMOs such as NAFO, who are responsible for the management
of other vulnerable SHMFS. Further, as evidenced by the sword-
fish case study, the domestic enforcement of RFMOs' TAC quotas
will continue to increase global awareness of the dangers posed by
the overfishing of SHMFS.
This article also urges the Canadian DFO to establish a
mandatory reporting procedure for Canadian vessels that witness
a foreign vessel's violation of a RFMO's directive on the high seas.
Implementation of this procedure could be achieved by rewarding
the reporting vessel with a portion of the collected fines paid by
the violator. Under the Fish Stocks Agreement, Canada is author-
ized to patrol international waters outside its EEZ to investigate
potential breaches of RFMOs' directives. 66 However, it is illogical
to assume that Canadian agents alone possess the necessary capa-
bilities to efficiently monitor all 202,080 km167 of Canada's coast-
line. Thus, it is imperative that domestic fishing fleets report
violations as they occur, inside or outside of the Canadian EEZ.
Furthermore, in order to ensure the fisheries' future health, sus-
tainability, and commercial longevity, Canadian agents must be
proactive in investigating these reported breaches. By unilaterally
164. See A Run on the Banks, supra note 1.
165. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 82.
166. See supra notes 85-86.
167. See CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK: CANADA (2009),
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/ca.html (last visited
Mar. 15, 2009).
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enforcing RFMOs' directives, Canada will set a stern precedent
that actions at odds with a RFMO's directive will not be tolerated
in North Atlantic waters.
On an international level, the United Nations must provide
adequate support and funding for developing states to ensure the
accomplishment of the goals set forth in the Fish Stocks Agree-
ment.'68 This article recommends the creation of an international
fisheries agency to identify developing states that do not possess
the resources necessary to enforce RFMOs' directives, and to pro-
vide these states with adequate funding and oversight to ensure
proper enforcement of the directives. Further, the agency should
be given the power to monitor all states' domestic fishery agencies
to make certain of their compliance with RFMOs' directives. By
monitoring domestic fishery agencies, the international agency
would be capable of exposing states and rooting out particular ves-
sels who blatantly disregard RFMOs' directives. This would allow
states enforcing the directives to key in on the habitual violators
and, through the Fish Stocks Agreement, force their compliance. 6 9
The establishment of an international fisheries agency should
not be regarded as an unnecessary relinquishment of sovereign
regulatory power. Rather, the agency should represent a con-
certed effort to promote maximum cooperation between states and
their respective domestic fisheries agencies at enforcing RFMOs'
directives. This article views the creation of an international fish-
eries agency and an international adherence to RFMOs' directives
as absolutely necessary to achieve the ultimate goals of the Fish
Stocks Agreement 7 ° and the sustainability of Canada's, and
indeed the world's, once magnificent SHMFS.
Canada's efforts to defend the North Atlantic fishery demon-
strate that one country's actions can help revitalize a distressed
fishery. However, in order to sustain the revitalization, there
must be an increased level of cooperation between all of the states
to conserve and maintain healthy fisheries. Canada has taken a
168. See Fish Stocks Agreement, supra note 82, at pmbl. ("Recognizing the need for
specific assistance, including financial [assistance] ... in order that developing States
can participate effectively in the conservation, management and sustainable use of
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks...").
169. To force compliance, the Fish Stocks Agreement authorizes states to board and
temporarily seize vessels suspected of violating a RFMO's directives, and
alternatively to resolve [any] disputes between states by any peaceful means
including negotiation, arbitration, and judicial settlement. See id. at arts. 20-27.
170. Id. at pmbl. ("Determined to ensure the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks ....").
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long and torturous road to arrive at this juncture. Other states
need not follow in Canada's footsteps, but instead should choose a
more pragmatic approach to preserve their own threatened
fisheries.
